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ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES 

sile uranium (ma~nly U-233) produced by 
neutron capture m thorium. This is recy­
cled and successive generations of fuel 
require smaller amounts of external fis­
s!le ':laterial until an equilibrium situa­
tion IS reached. Table 2 shows U-235 
requirements for successive generations 
of a particular cycle. 
The fuel burn-up for the successive 
generations is maintained constant at 
29.3MWdlkg highly enriched uranium. 
After four generations, the U-235 
r~quirements have reached an equilib­
nu~ level _of a little over 4g/kg highly 
~nnched With the remaining fissile load­
mg ~oming from the spent fuel of the 
previous generation. This equilibrium 
level_of external fissile requirements is a 
functiOn of the desired fuel burn-up as 
shown in table 3 for U-235-topped 
thorium cycle s4. 
The requirements for three thorium 
cycles are compared with those for the 
natural uranium, once-through cycle. 
The equilibrium U-235 concentration in 
fresh fuel increases with the desired 
burn-up. This has also been expressed as 
the Candu reactor lifetime requirements 
(assuming a 30-year life at an average 
load factor of 80 per cent) for natural 
uranium. 
The figures for the thorium cycles 
were derived on the basis that the natural 
uranium is fed to an enrichment plant 
operating at 0.2 per cent tails and the 
ur~~ium enriched to 93 per cent prior to 
m1xmg with the thorium. A tight control 
of reproce·ssing and fabrication losses; 
t?gether with a one-year recycle delay 
hme, is also assumed. Also shown are 
the thorium requirements assuming a 3 
per cent loss during reprocessing, fol­
lowed by a 10-year hold up period before 
re fabrication. 
A significant reduction in uranium 

requirements can be achieved by using 

the thorium cycle. Replacement reactors 

h_ave even lower uranium requirements 

~mce a major part of the initial fissile 

mventory is already available in the 

spent fuel of the decommissioned reac­

tor. 
At present it is difficult to define a 
unique reference thorium cycle because 
the range of possible systems is broad 
and the characteristics would be tailored 
~o the particular circumstances of 
I~plementation. High uranium utiliza­
tion dictates a low bum-up cycle but 
economic considerations indicate a high 
burn-up cycle to reduce the impact of the 
reprocessing and refabrication charges. 
System studiess on the impact of intro­
ducing thorium cycles in Canada during 
the next century indicate that an inter­
~ediate bum-up cycle (20-30MWdlkg 








Although no reprocessing plant can be made completely dh·ersion 
,, 
proof choice of reprocessing system can help make a plant proJif. ·~ ;I , l eration resistant. This article examines techniques for deciding 
which methods most hinder the would-be divertor. i i 
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Economic evaluation of thorium 
cycles is uncertain since costs can only be 
derived for conceptual designs of repro­
cessing and refabrication facilities which 
have not yet been demonstrated. Cur­
rent studies indicate that the fuelling 
costs of the thorium cycle are greater 
than those for once-through natural 
uranium fuelling and will be equal only if 
the natural uranium price rises to at least 
$200/kg u. 
The self-sufficient equilibrium 
thorium (SSET) cycle illustrated in table 
3 is important from a strategic view­
point. After an initial fissile inventory 
has been provided, this cycle offers the 
possibility of continued energy produc­
tion fuelled only by thorium. The initial 
fissile inventory could be highly enriched 
uranium, plutonium or uranium-233. 
The quantities required for highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium initiation 
are given in table 4, together with the 
quantities of source material. 
It is uncertain at present what bum-up 
can be obtained consistent with .selfc 
sufficiency. The cycle must breed slightly 
more fissible material than it consumes 
to compensate for reprocessing and 
refabrication losses. A more neutron­
economic Candu design is possible to 
meet this requirement~ but nuclear data 
are too uncertain to allow an accurate 
prediction of attainable burn-up. More 
experimental work is required in this 
area. 
So, to summarize, use of thorium 
~ycles in Candu reactors considerably 
mcreases the energy obtainable from a 
given uranium resource base. It seems 
that the proven Candu design can be 
adapted to the thorium cycle with little 
or no modification. The main develop­
ments required before a thorium cycle 
can be implemented arc in the areas of 
fuel reprocessing and fabrication. The 
tactical advantages of using thorium fuel 
in once-through fuel cycles during the 
introductory phase are being investi­
gated. For the recycle mode, fuel cycle 
costs are higher than those "for uranium 
once-through systems but likely trends in 
uranium price could make thorium cycles 
economically attractive in the next cen­
tury. The economic viability of the self­
sufficient equilibrium thorium cycle is 
more uncertain but offers the potential 
of insurance against uranium shortages 
and an upper limit to nuclear energy 
costs from Candu. 
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Although there clearly cannot be a tech­
nical fix to answer the nuclear prolifera­
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tion problem. significant differences Jl 
between reprocessing technologies exist jl 
with respect to their relative diversion 1i 
resistance. Manv methods for the repro­




ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES 

bi"i§eder spent fuel have been shown to 
be technically feasible. These techniques 
include CIVEX, AIROX, pyrometal­
lurgical processes such as the tin nitride 
process, and high-volatility methods . 1 
Recently, these methods have gained 
increased attention in the United States 
and elsewhere because of concern over 
the potential for diversion of reactor­
grade plutonium from the relatively 
purified product stream of the PUREX 
process.2 
Methods of processing 
·The PUREX process was developed 
from military operations in the United 
States during the 1940s at Hanford. 
Because PUREX was designed for 
weapons applications some people have 
suggested that other methods should be 
developed for civilian applications.3 
These methods involve either modifica­
tions of the PUREX process, such as 
co-processing,4 Pu-238 spiking methods5 
and the CIVEX process for breeder 
fuel, 6 or are based on entirely separate 
techniques such as salt transport and 
pyrometallurgy. 1 
In comparing these technologies, it 
must be remembered that PUREX 
remains the most technically advanced. 
So, for other methods to compete sue-
be increased either by making it almost 
impossible to obtain such material, 
and/or ensuring that the product of the 
process is not easily convertible to a 
weapons usable status. The first charac­
teristic can be achieved by strengthening 
international safeguards, e.g., physical 
surveillance, installation of detection 
instruments, etc. The second charac­
teristic is a function of the in he rent prop­
erties of the reprocessing technology 
itself. 
While safeguards are important, this 
paper explores the possibility for 
increasing diversion resistance as a func­
tion of this second characteristic. With 
reference to the illustration it is steps 1 
and 3 that most concern us here; step 2 is 
subject to physical containment while 
step 4 is outside the scope of this 
analysis. 
Favourable properties 
We can define three principal attri­
butes of inherent process diversion resis­
tance: dilution of the weapons usable 
material in the product-waste streams; 
physical inability to extract weapons 
usable material from the streams (or a 
limited extraction capability); and con­
version process and handlingdifficul ties. 
A product stream of weapons grade 
Steps in the process of an aHempt to divert nuclear materials from a nuclear power fuel 
facility for explosive purposes. 






cessfully, they must not only be shown to 
appreciably increase diversion resis­
tance but to do so without adverse 
economic effects. 
To assess the relative diversion resis­
tance of the various reprocessing 
methods, it is useful to establish a set of 
generic characteristics that define a pro­
cess that is acceptably diversion resis- · 
tant. This paper describes two methods 
for doing this. In a hypothetical diver­
sion attempt, four major steps are 
involved (as shown in the illustration 
above). This paper is limited to a dis­
cussion of the difficulties of the first 
three steps in this process. 
Diversion resistance characteristics 
The purpose of making diversion 
resistance a design criterion is to minim­
ize the likelihood of a successful diver­
sion of nuclear material. Resistance can 
Process and 
Further Refine Fabricate 
material Nuclear 




quality is most desirable for would-bt: 
divertors. Product streams offering less 
than weapons grade offer some diver­
sion resistance. Co-processing of 
plutonium with uranium does not affect 
the recyclability of the recovered mater­
ial to power reactors but does increase 
the amount of additional processing 
necessary by a potential divertor. Low 
decontamination factors (of the order of 
103 ) not only pose health hazards to 
divertors but means they need a know­
ledge of remote handling equipment. A 
low concentration of weapons usable 
material means large volumes must be 
div~rted to obtaip significant quantities. 
Thts would essentially eliminate a 
:·one-shot deal" and statistically 
Increase the probability of detection. 
If the piping network is complex a 
potential divertor needs a more com­
prehensive knowledge of the process 
before he can successfully obtain the 
material. However, it also makes detec­
tion by international authorities more 
difficult; it is easier to monitor and detect 
accounting errors when there are com· 
paratively few product/effluent streams. 
So from an "easier-to-detect" view­
point processes with less complex pro· 
cessing sequences are considered more 
diversion resistant. 
Material that is difficult to handle is 
less likely to be successfully diverted. 
High radiation levels (low decontamina· 
tion factors) affect the handling diffi· 
culty. High temperature liquid metals 
and salts are harder to handle than room 
temperature aqueous solutions making 
diversion less likely. Gaseous streams 
are harder to tap and disperse easil~ i~ 
the event of a loss of containment; thtsiS 
particularly true for high pressure pro­
cesses. 
Just as important as the factors discus· 
sed above is the ease by which the pro· 
cess can be diluted and/or fission product 
spiked. If diluents and/or spiking agents 
can be introduced into the process 
stream diversion can be made extremely 
difficult and any diverted material can be 
rendered essentially useless for actual 
explosive purposes. 
Decision analysis techniques 

In general techniques available for

' be
selecting between processes can. 
categorized into two groups; the steve 
approach and the ranking approach. 
The Sieve approach consists of sequen­
tial elimination of candidates through 
successive application of criteria. These 
criteria are usually defined in rank o~der 
as primary, secondary and ter:~a& 
criteria. This approach has been ~I eh 
. f mple m t e 
used by geologists; or exa ' "t­
selection of a high-level waste reposi 
ory. oo~ 
In the sieve approach, a proce~s n 
tinues to be a candidate only if_It ~0 n­
tinues to meet the higher order cnt~ro d 
It emerges as a potential candidate~ a~e 
only if it meets all the criteria. 1~ m_t · 
. e cntena IS 
course of the analysts a~y ~n and the 
not met the process is ehmmated d of 
next process analyzed. This metho that 
analysis defines those procesdses not 
. d . ·a but oes
meet all reqUire cnten . erits 
give an indication of the relative m 
of the processes analyzed. 1 ped in The ranking approach, dev~ 0 deci­
the formal discipline of Bayesta~·tatiVe 
sion analysis 8 allows for a quan I tives 
. ' · of alterna · 
relative companson Juated 
Reprocessing methods can be eva et of 
for their performance under .a·~n can 
criteria (or attributes) a~dyro~~~nce of 
be made for differe~ce 10• tm6e analysis. 
each attribute quantified tn t n the 
. d "f" ce betwee The principal t .eren . h sieve 
two approaches is that whtle t e L 
TERNATIONA NUCLEAR ENGINEERING IN 48 
! I ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES 
Application of the ranking decision analysis approach to the reprocessing technology selection process. 
Warning Radiation level 
Reprocessing Development period (Rlhr at Criticality Development 
technology time 
(year) 
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*Overt and covert refer to whether or not a no t t ·tin the salt trans ort a  . . . n-weapons_ s a e a~tempts to divert material from the commercial plant either covertly or overtl 
processing is ne~essa~ ~~ ~:q~:~~o~~~~e~s~~t~~i~l~etalllc form ~ o~e ot the process. streams in the plant. If diversion occurs at that point ~0 outside 
or an exp1os1ve. n a 11other matenals, many success1ve stages are necessary. 
approach evaluates a process against a 
set ~f criteria applied sequentially, the 
ran~mg approach evaluates a process 
agamst multiple criteria simultaneously. 
The r~nking approach has the advantage 
of bemg able to quantitatively compare 
alternatives relative to each other while 
the sieve approach must rely on a more 
absolute determination of an acceptable 
alternative. 
To demonstrate these techniques, five 
reprocessing methods have been 
selected for analysis. These include 
AIROX, halide volatility, PUREX, salt 
tra.;•sJ?ort and the tin nitride processes. 
Thts ts not a complete list of available 
alternatives, but these five have been 
chosen to represent the wide range of 
process types available. 
The AIROX9 process is a low decon­
tamination reprocessing technique that 
ta~es ~he spent fuel through successive 
oxtdatiOn and reduction stages using 
oxygen and hydrogen. The oxidation 
step is also used for decladding as U02 
expands 30 per cent by volume when it 
changes to U30s. The halide volatility 
technique converts the spent fuel to the 
hexafluorides and then separates them 
by the difference in their boiling points. 
The great majority of fission products 
form fluorides which volatilize at high 
temperatures. Of the fluorides which 
volatilize more readily than uranium 
hexafluoride, only tellurium hexaf­
luoride is a gas at ordinary temperatures 
so it can be separated readily. Uranium 
hexafluoride boils at 56.2°C and 
plutonium hexafluoride at 62.3°C so it is 
easy to separate them. 
The PUREX process is the only 
commercially available reprocessing 
technique. It is an aqueous solvent 
extraction technique and is described in 
detail in several sources'" and so will not 
be described here. 
The salt transport process wasf· 
designed for plutonium recovery from 
LMFBR fuels. Decladding is aecmn-­
plished by immersing fuel sub­
assemblies in liquid zinc at about 850°C. 
The uranium oxide and plutonium oxide 
November 1979 
in the fuel are converted to metal before 
going through a series of liquid metal­
molten salt solvent extractions yielding 
metallic uranium and plutonium. The tin 
nitride process involves dissolving the 
spent fuel in liquid tin followed by selec­
tive nitriding of uranium. The fission 
products either form nitrides or inter­
metallics both of which float; the 
uranium nitride precipitates out along 
with the plutonium and other actinide 
nitrides. 
A sample quantitative analysis 
The sieve and ranking methods will 
now be applied to the five reprocessing 
technologies described earlier to show 
how the method works and compare the 
results. The first, or primary, criterion 
applied in this example is that plutonium 
must not be separated out during repro­
cessing. This criterion is met by only two 
of the five processes; AIROX and tin 
nitride. The halide volatility, PUREX 
and salt transport processes aim at pro­
ducing a relatively pure stream of 
plutonium and therefore violate the 
primary criterion. AIROX and tin nit­
ride, however, not only do not separate 
out plutonium but_cannot do so. In fact, 
the applicability of the oxidation­
reduction reactions proposed in the 
AIROX process for uranium fuels have 
not been experimentally verified for 
plutonium.
Both AIROX and tin nitr¥!c arc low 
decontamination processes and as such 
handling is difficult. The process temp­
eratures arc aTso high. The materials in 
the tin nitride process are probably har­
der to handle since thcv arc dissolved in 
molten tin at around 150<YC. The 
AJROX process, because it uses hyd­
rogen in one of the unit operations, could 
force the divertor to face explosion risks. 
Though neither of these processes are 
extremely complex, they lend them­
selves to dilution as a means of reducing 
the concentration of fissile material in 
the product stream. In the AIROX pro­
cess dilution could be affected after 
decl~dding is complete and the uranium 
oxide pellets arc pulverized. 
The tin nitride process offers easier 
dilution as it is merely necessary tn 
reduce the input of spent fuel into the 
molten tin bath at the time of initial dis­
solution. Spiking agents can also be 
added at dilution making the fissile mat­
erial less desirable to the potential diver­
tor. However, increasing the number of 
spiking agents can adversely effect the 
reactivity coefficient in a reactor causing 
significant economic enrichment penal­
tics to compensate for a reduction in 
reactivity. These penalties arc sufficient 
enough to warrant a careful co~t-bcncfit 
comparison of process economics with 
diversion resistance. 
From this analysis the A IROX and tin 
nitride processes are found to be most 
diversion resistant; both technologies 
offer handling difficulties due to low 
decontamination and high procesli 
temperatures. The AIROX pmce~s 
poses an explosion danger to the diver­
tor whereas the tin nitride proces~ is 
more amenable to dilution. 
The ranking approach emplo)ed to 
distinguish between the sample repro-­
cessing technologies is that developed b)' 
Papazogluet a/' 1 at Ma!;sachu!>etls Jn:.ti­
tute of Technology. This method is 
based on the principles of multi-attribute 
decision theory wherein a ~~ of indiceli 
or attributes which characterize the pro­
liferation resistance of the technologies 
is defined and evaluated. 
For this particular application, a~~ of 
five attributes arc considered important 
to a potential divcrtnr"s dcci~ion to u~ a 
given technology to derive weapom 
material. The first attribute i~ the 
den~lopmcnt time, or the time it takes 
from start to fini~h to develop a nuclear 
explo~ive using diverted nuclear mater­
ial. The warning period, defined as the 
percentage of the development tas.k left 
to complete at the time of detection by 
outside agents, is the second attribute. 
The third is the inherent diffirult) of 
utilizing the technology as a source of 
nuclear fissile material. defined further 
by a breakdown into three sub-attributes 
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- the radioactivity level of the process, 
the status of sci~ntific and technical 
information known about the process by 
the potential proliferator, and the level 
of criticality probkm associated with the 
process. The fourth attribute is the 
weapons material quality, defined as the 
type of nuclear material diverted (i.e., 
either weapons or reactor grade 
plutonium, or enriched uranium (U-233 
or U-235)), and the fifth is the develop­
ment cost of the explosive construction 
attempt. 
Numerical values of resistance 
To derive a quantitative indicator of 
the relative diversion resistance of each 
technology, a value function for each 
attribute has been defined so that a 
dimensionless numerical indicator for 
each technology can be calculated. The 
numerical indicators for each attribute 
are then multiplied by weighting factors 
and summed over the number of attri­
butes to arrive at a single numerical 
indicator for each fuel cycle strategy. 
Basically, the purpose of the value func­
tion is to provide a numerical measure of 
the relative attractiveness of the various 
proliferation pathways available to the 
would-be proliferator. 
The results of the analysis show, on a 
scale of -1 to 0, that the AIRO X and tin 
nitride processes are most diversion 
resistant overall and that PUREX is the 
least resistant (see the table). These 
results occur because of the greater 
development time necessary for explo­
sive· construction, the lower status of 
information concerning the processes 
and the higher development costs. Also, 
the higher radiation levels make these 
processes more diversion resistant. The 
salt transport process shows good diver­
sion resistance for the covert case, but 
not for the overt case. Its overall ranking 
of -0.24 is close enough to that of 
AIROX and tin nitride (both -0.23) to 
consider them essentially the same. 
Although the salt transport process pro­
duces metallic plutonium, the medium 
level criticality problem posed to the 
potential divertor contributes to its 
diversion resistance. 
However, that the ultimate choice 
between reprocessing technologies must 
not be based solely on a single criterion 
such as diversion resistance but on other 
important selection criteria as well, such 
as economics, environmental and safety 
aspects. is evident. The nuclear industry 
today is at a cross road and the prolifera­
tion issue is only one among many other 
major concerns. Technologies that do 
not meet diversion resistance standards 
need to be clearly identified and alter­
nate technologies developed that can 
simultaneously optimize all important 
selection criterion. Other aspects that 
can be expected to influence the decision 
include: the effect a choice of an alter­
nate reprocessing technology will have 
on existing fuel cycle facilities and 
economics; impact on reactivity and 
reactor design (e.g., effect on enrich­
ment levels and burnable poison man­
agement); waste management implica­
tions; and the stage of development of 
the alternatives. 
Research and development decisions 
must not be based solely on political con­
siderations; they must also be based on 
sound technical analysis. Utilization of 
quantitative decision analysis techniques 
can provide the required firm foundation 
for technical decisions. Application of 
these methods compels policy makers to 
define clearly the criteria upon which 
they evaluate alternatives and to record 
their personal preferences and biases 
towards the importance of each criteria. 
Equally as important is the mechanism 
that decision analysis provides for updat­
ing the evaluation in the light ofnew data 
and experimental evidence. All of these 
factors suggest that such methods should 
be more widely applied and accepted in 
the policy making arena. 
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Plutoniunt processing for 

th~ fast reactor· fuel cycle 

By R. H. Allardice* and H. A. Taylort 
Current Dounreay and Windscale experience in reprocessing, 
fabrication and plutonium waste operations together with the 
continuing UK development programme to establish process and 
plant design for larger scale operations is described in this paper· 
The necessity for considering these fuel cycle operations as an 
entity and avoiding the independent optimization of individual 
areas, in order to obtain the preferred balance for safe and 
reliable Pu processing operations is emphasized. 
Following the decision made in the late 
1960s to construct the Prototype Fast 
Reactor- PFR (600MWth, 250e) on the 
same site at Dounreay as the Experi­
mental Fast Reactor- DFR (60MWth, 
15e ), it was decided in 1970/71 to com­
plete the fuel cycle by reprocessing the 
irradiated fuel in the near term rather 
than at a later date. (A typical fast 
breeder reactor fuel cycle is shown in 
Fig. 1.) This policy was adopted not only 
to reduce the PFR plutonium inventory 
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and to take the reactor operation 
through the full fuel recycle stages, but 
more significantly to demonstrate and 
prove the viability of the whole fuel cycle 
and to explore all facets of the reproces­
sing and associated waste treatment. 
It was decided to modify and extend 
the existing DFR metallic uranium fuel 
reprocessing plant which also offered. t~t 
opportunity to demonstrate the poss1bi ­
ity of extending the life of r.e~unda~~ 
highly active plant. A schematic dlustr. 
tion of the modified building is shown ill 
Fig. 2. These modifications were com­
pleted in 1979. The plant will start 
reprocessing high burn-up fuel (at 8·10 
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